In an anarchic international system, when two states stand in a relationship of security competition, if one state (A) perceives that another state (B) is about to impose an endgame lock-in against it and establish an irreversible security advantage, then A's game-theoretic optimal move is to launch war before B completes the endgame lock-in, thereby denying B's endgame lock-in. This proposition is the basic form of what Mr. NoisyClock calls the "theory of perceived endgame lock-in."
From this basic form, one can easily infer the following: when A perceives that:
- B has already entered the endgame-lock-in channel;
- and A must ultimately deny that endgame lock-in through war.
Then the earlier A launches war, the better.
More concretely, endgame lock-in commonly includes situations such as these:
- B is about to acquire an overwhelming, unilateral capacity to destroy A, such as a nuclear-strike lock-in, or the construction of a U.S. strategic missile-defense system;
- B is about to cross a capability threshold that changes its strategic disadvantage vis-a-vis A, as in the Iranian nuclear issue;
- B is about to manufacture a political fact that fundamentally raises the political and strategic cost for A to change the situation, as in Taiwanese independence.
Mr. NoisyClock regards this theory as a theory of strategic psychology and a theory of war. That is, it attempts to describe how strategic decision-makers actually think, and to provide a better theoretical explanation for the outbreak of war than classical theories offer.
Mr. NoisyClock's theory of perceived endgame lock-in is not a theory about how states ought to behave rationally. It is a theory about how strategic decision-makers conduct strategic perception and strategic decision-making.
Traditional theories of war and security focus on capability, and therefore often approximate national security as the state's capacity to defend its security. This is, in effect, a non-strategic and non-game-theoretic theory of security and war. Security-dilemma theory gives a game-theoretic explanation for the outbreak of war, but it does not go deeply into the micro-mechanism, nor does it propose strategic options for avoiding war.
Therefore, traditional capability-centered theories of security and strategy are, first, undesirable: according to Mr. NoisyClock's theory of perceived endgame lock-in, if strategic decision-makers act entirely according to these theories, they will inevitably lead to war. This is what is meant by "absolute security is absolute insecurity." Second, such theories are incomplete, because there are obviously not that many wars in the world. This shows that strategic decision-makers possess agency that these theories have not captured, and that this agency allows war to be avoided.
Why, in fact, are there not more wars? Why did the Soviet Union not launch an endgame-lock-in-denial war against the United States? Why has mainland China not yet launched a war to unify Taiwan?
Because security is not only about capability. It is even more about strategic thought and the structure of the game. Mr. NoisyClock therefore proposes the "strategically compatible security theorem":
Under given technological, resource, and cultural conditions (conditions under which we usually live), there exists a strategically compatible security framework that can avoid the war crises described by the theory of perceived endgame lock-in.
So what is a strategically compatible security framework?
A strategically compatible security framework is a strategic game framework in which, for both players, the return on security investment in endgame lock-in is far lower than the return on security investment in not pursuing endgame lock-in.
Is such a framework possible? Yes.
When capabilities are relatively close, if state A adopts the following strategy, it can force state B to adopt the same strategy:
- An endgame-lock-in-denial strategy: that is, seeking to deny B's endgame lock-in, rather than seeking to impose endgame lock-in on B.
- Establishing a credible commitment not to pursue endgame lock-in.
Let us now specify the "endgame-lock-in-denial strategy." This strategy is, in essence, an asymmetric strategy. In nuclear strategy, the typical endgame-lock-in-denial strategy is China's minimum nuclear deterrence strategy. Its logic is not to seek nuclear capabilities that overwhelm the other side, but to seek a minimal, credible nuclear retaliatory capability that the other side cannot bear.
This strategic choice is easy to realize and extremely low-cost. It can be established by creating uncertainty (concealing the scale of one's nuclear arsenal, conducting large-scale camouflage) and by developing a small number of key capabilities. By contrast, for the other side to deny one's endgame-lock-in denial would require exponential costs: China only needs a few ballistic missiles to penetrate the defense, while the United States must ensure that not a single one gets through. Under broadly contemporary technological and physical conditions, the cost for the United States to pursue denial of China's endgame-lock-in denial is extremely high, and therefore infeasible.
In addition, the capabilities required by an endgame-lock-in-denial strategy have relatively high strategic feasibility: they usually do not create strategic misjudgment. The strategic capabilities needed to deny endgame-lock-in denial, however, are far less feasible strategically and politically. As we pointed out in the theory of perceived endgame lock-in, if the United States were about to complete construction of a strategic missile-defense capability, and if by eight o'clock tomorrow morning it would be able to intercept 100% of China's strategic missiles, then Chinese strategic decision-makers would possess a tremendous advantage: they would know, and they would know that American strategic decision-makers also know, that their only game-theoretic option is to launch all intercontinental missiles right now.
But when China builds endgame-lock-in-denial capabilities, American strategic decision-makers do not possess this advantage. The American president cannot press the nuclear button merely because China is developing minimum nuclear deterrence or deploying fake missile launch vehicles across the country.
When one side implements an endgame-lock-in-denial strategy, the other side will be forced to follow.
Naturally, when one side adopts an endgame-lock-in-denial strategy, it can pair this with self-limitation of its strategic options, namely by establishing a credible commitment not to pursue endgame lock-in. This is what Thomas Schelling once correctly pointed out: one can strengthen one's bargaining position by limiting one's own options.
China's NFU (no-first-use nuclear strategy) is precisely such a commitment. When one side establishes a credible commitment not to pursue endgame lock-in, it gains greater room for strategic capability development, giving it more freedom to build endgame-lock-in-denial capabilities.
For example, China in fact possesses a strategic privilege to launch intermediate-range ballistic missiles, whereas the United States does not. Because China, through the self-castration of NFU, avoids the strategic burden of triggering miscalculation. Any launch of a strategic missile by the United States, however, carries the possibility of being misread: American strategic decision-makers know this, and they know that China knows it; China also knows that the United States knows that China knows it.
In sum: when one side adopts an endgame-lock-in-denial strategy, the other side will be forced to adopt the same strategy. This is the strategically compatible security framework.
Mr. NoisyClock believes that this theory has both theoretical and practical value. On June 2, 2026, at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio gave an almost textbook explanation of perceived endgame lock-in as the rationale for U.S. military action against Iran.
Rubio said that Iran was attempting to build a "conventional shield" composed of drones, missiles, naval forces, and other conventional capabilities, and to develop its nuclear program behind that shield. Once the shield was complete, Iran would enter a "point of immunity": if the United States and Israel then sought to strip it of its nuclear capability, they would face unbearable conventional retaliatory costs. This is literally what Mr. NoisyClock means by "perceived endgame lock-in."
Mr. NoisyClock and his good friend Guiguzi Schelling (Mr. Gui is a central figure in Mr. NoisyClock's work The European Republic) completed this essay in Yosemite.
May this essay be of some use to world peace.
June 2026
Yosemite, beside a lake whose name we did not know